In this paper, we present a novel threat model, **XDAuth** that arises from public authoritative nameserver infrastructure’s failure to isolate data across zones adequately.
This paper proposes the TuDoor Attack, by systematically exploring and exploiting logic vulnerabilities in DNS response pre-processing with malformed packets, leading to DNS cache poisoning (1s), denial-of-service, and resource consuming attacks.
In this paper, we propose **Phoenix Domain**, a general and novel attack that allows adversaries to maintain the revoked malicious domain continuously resolvable at scale, which enables an old, mitigated attack, Ghost Domain.
In this paper, we present a novel framework, **HostingChecker** (**DareShark**), for detecting domain takeovers.
DNS packets are designed to travel in unencrypted form through the Internet based on its initial standard. Recent discoveries show that real-world adversaries are actively exploiting this design vulnerability to compromise Internet users' security …